The end is near. Hilo Oficial de la Crisis Económica La vida al margen del deporte (la hay) Moderadores: Trager, andraax, Locutus, hastrakan, Roy Lichtenstein

[Fizban·]

Muy, muy curioso...

Income inequality is at its lowest level since the height of Thatcherism, according to official figures published on Tuesday, with jobs growth and low inflation in 2015-16 boosting poorer households’ living standards while earnings for the richest fell.

The figures, which show inequality at its lowest since 1986, highlight the difference between perceptions that the wage gap between the richest and poorest is growing and the data.

The Office for National Statistics published the data on the day that Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn floated the idea, which he later stepped back from, of a cap on high pay. “We cannot go on creating worse levels of inequality,” he said.

The figures are the most up-to-date income inequality statistics and the first to provide evidence on 2015-16, with a history of more than 50 years. In June, figures based on a larger survey will be published. In the past these have also shown gradually decreasing income inequality in recent years.

Average household incomes for four-fifths of the population outside the richest 20 per cent were all higher in 2015-16 than before the financial crisis after taking inflation into account.

Incomes of the households in the poorest 20 per cent were 13 per cent higher than in 2007-08, while those in the middle of the income distribution were about 5 per cent higher. For the richest 20 per cent of households, incomes were 3 per cent lower on average than before the crisis.

This pattern of bigger rises in incomes for poorer households and drops among richer households has shown up in measures of inequality. The gini coefficient — a summary measure that has a value of 0 if there is total equality and 1 if one household has all the UK’s income — has declined steadily since it peaked in the early 1990s.



Measuring private sources of income alone — wages, self employment income, investment income and private pensions — inequality of “original incomes” was 0.49 in 2015-16, 8 per cent lower than its 1993 peak.

Household disposable incomes are distributed much more equally after the deduction of taxes and addition of cash benefits and tax credits with a gini coefficient of 0.32 in 2015-16. The ONS calculated that inequality of disposable income fell in 2015-16 to its lowest level since 1986, 14 per cent below its 1993 peak.



Matthew Whittaker, chief economist of the Resolution Foundation, said the perception gap between the facts on inequality and widespread complaints that living standards are inadequate is explained by the extremely low levels of income growth in the UK since the financial crisis.

Between 2007-08 and 2015-16, the annual growth of average incomes has been less than half the level of Thatcher period and the period between 1990 and 2007-08.

“There’s little comfort to be taken in the fact that inequality has narrowed when everyone is feeling that their living standards expectations aren’t being met,” Mr Whittaker said.

The section of society that has done best since 2007-08 are pensioners, who have had 13 per cent income gains, while non-pensioners have on average seen their disposable incomes fall 1.2 per cent.

The figures also show that the UK’s 5m rural households are richer on average than 20m urban counterparts, with countryside average disposable household incomes of £35,500 and urban incomes of only £32,500.

If experts from the Resolution Foundation and the Institute for Fiscal Studies are correct, 2016 is set to be the last year for some time of falling income inequality, because benefits for non-pensioners are set to be frozen for four years in cash terms until 2020.

https://www.ft.com/content/394b82da-d74f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e

[Ainsthrilln Turion]

La normalización del mercado, gracias en parte a la actuación del BCE, consiguió que el precio medio de las nuevas emisiones de deuda soberana española en 2016 se redujera hasta el 0,61%, lo que llevó el precio de la deuda en circulación a caer al 2,19% al cierre del ejercicio, el más bajo de la historia del Tesoro.

http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2017/01/15/economia/1484495323_970840.html

Los malvados especuladores no están haciendo bien su trabajo...

[Hay_sinla]

Las mentiras de las políticas de represión salarial
FERNANDO LUENGO
Uno de los focos fundamentales de la política económica llevada a cabo por el Gobierno del Partido Popular y exigida por la troika comunitaria se ha dirigido a la dinámica laboral. Con dos objetivos. En primer lugar, contener el crecimiento de los salarios; en segundo lugar, proceder a una reforma del mercado de trabajo.
El diagrama ilustra con claridad el relato dominante que justifica ambas políticas. Al reducir los costes de las empresas, los precios bajan y la inversión se dinamiza; lo primero fortalece la competitividad, y lo segundo aumenta la productividad. La consecuencia de todo ello es la intensificación del crecimiento, lo que tira del empleo. Finalmente, también crecen los salarios, que pueden acompañar las mejoras de la productividad. No obstante, la reproducción de este círculo virtuoso depende de que se mantenga la moderación salarial y las instituciones laborales favorezcan las respuestas empresariales a las variaciones del ciclo económico.

Seis premisas sostienen este razonamiento.
En primer lugar, los salarios determinan los costes. No es cierto. Los costes laborales representan una parte relativamente reducida, y variable según el tipo de establecimiento y el sector en el que opera, de los costes totales de las firmas. Los de índole no laboral –energéticos, financieros y otros-- son, en términos porcentuales, más relevantes.
En segundo lugar, los costes determinan los precios. Aunque evidentemente influyen en estos, también hay que tener en cuenta los márgenes de beneficio con los que operan las empresas. Estas pueden intentar obtener una ventaja competitiva en el mercado, fruto de la contención salarial, sin ajustar la tasa de ganancia.
En tercer lugar, los precios determinan la competitividad. Como antes, influyen, sin duda alguna, pero están lejos de ser decisivos en los segmentos de mercado más dinámicos, donde otros factores distintos del triángulo salarios-costes-precios --como la tecnología, la sofisticación y la calidad de los servicios ofrecidos-- desempeñan un papel cada vez más importante en la presencia internacional de las empresas.
En cuarto lugar, la moderación de los costes laborales dinamiza las inversiones productivas. La evidencia empírica apunta justamente en el sentido contrario. Los esfuerzos en materia de disciplina salarial no se han visto recompensados por un aumento significativo de la formación bruta de capital fijo, que se ha mantenido en los años de crisis en niveles muy bajos. Asimismo, el estancamiento salarial en el periodo de expansión económica fue compatible con el debilitamiento de la actividad inversora.
En quinto lugar, el crecimiento económico se convierte en empleo. Es cierto que la expansión del Producto Interior Bruto tiene una incidencia positiva en el número de puestos de trabajo, pero la mayor explotación laboral (ritmos de trabajo más intensos, aumento de las horas extraordinarias) limita este efecto; además, buena parte de los nuevos empleos son de pésima calidad (contratos precarios y salarios bajos). Hay que reparar, en fin, en que en las épocas de auge económico las tasas de desempleo se han mantenido en umbrales relativamente elevados.
En sexto lugar, el crecimiento de los salarios sigue al de la productividad. Falso. Desde hace décadas, la evolución de ambas variables no está sincronizada, lo que explica que, en el conjunto de las economías comunitarias, la parte de los salarios en la renta nacional se haya reducido. Esta tendencia se ha acentuado durante la crisis. En España la productividad laboral ha aumentado fruto, sobre todo, de la masiva destrucción de empleos, al tiempo que han retrocedido los salarios de la mayor parte de los trabajadores.
Si las afirmaciones contenidas en esas premisas carecen de fundamentación teórica y empírica, si los resultados obtenidos han quedado muy lejos de los previstos, si, lejos de contribuir a la superación de la crisis, las economías han quedado atrapadas en un bucle de débil, inestable e insuficiente crecimiento…si todo est
o ha ocurrido, es obligado proceder a una revisión en profundidad de las políticas laborales.
Fernando Luengo. Profesor de Economía Aplicada de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid y miembro de Podemos (círculo de Moncloa-Chamberí).
http://ctxt.es/es/20170125/Politica/107 ... miento.htm

[Hay_sinla]

La recuperación de la economía española, ¿un velo fugaz para las cuestiones de fondo?

Daniel Albarracín

http://blogs.publico.es/dominiopublico/ ... -de-fondo/

[Paco Le Monde]

Muy, muy curioso...

Income inequality is at its lowest level since the height of Thatcherism, according to official figures published on Tuesday, with jobs growth and low inflation in 2015-16 boosting poorer households’ living standards while earnings for the richest fell.

The figures, which show inequality at its lowest since 1986, highlight the difference between perceptions that the wage gap between the richest and poorest is growing and the data.

The Office for National Statistics published the data on the day that Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn floated the idea, which he later stepped back from, of a cap on high pay. “We cannot go on creating worse levels of inequality,” he said.

The figures are the most up-to-date income inequality statistics and the first to provide evidence on 2015-16, with a history of more than 50 years. In June, figures based on a larger survey will be published. In the past these have also shown gradually decreasing income inequality in recent years.

Average household incomes for four-fifths of the population outside the richest 20 per cent were all higher in 2015-16 than before the financial crisis after taking inflation into account.

Incomes of the households in the poorest 20 per cent were 13 per cent higher than in 2007-08, while those in the middle of the income distribution were about 5 per cent higher. For the richest 20 per cent of households, incomes were 3 per cent lower on average than before the crisis.

This pattern of bigger rises in incomes for poorer households and drops among richer households has shown up in measures of inequality. The gini coefficient — a summary measure that has a value of 0 if there is total equality and 1 if one household has all the UK’s income — has declined steadily since it peaked in the early 1990s.



Measuring private sources of income alone — wages, self employment income, investment income and private pensions — inequality of “original incomes” was 0.49 in 2015-16, 8 per cent lower than its 1993 peak.

Household disposable incomes are distributed much more equally after the deduction of taxes and addition of cash benefits and tax credits with a gini coefficient of 0.32 in 2015-16. The ONS calculated that inequality of disposable income fell in 2015-16 to its lowest level since 1986, 14 per cent below its 1993 peak.



Matthew Whittaker, chief economist of the Resolution Foundation, said the perception gap between the facts on inequality and widespread complaints that living standards are inadequate is explained by the extremely low levels of income growth in the UK since the financial crisis.

Between 2007-08 and 2015-16, the annual growth of average incomes has been less than half the level of Thatcher period and the period between 1990 and 2007-08.

“There’s little comfort to be taken in the fact that inequality has narrowed when everyone is feeling that their living standards expectations aren’t being met,” Mr Whittaker said.

The section of society that has done best since 2007-08 are pensioners, who have had 13 per cent income gains, while non-pensioners have on average seen their disposable incomes fall 1.2 per cent.

The figures also show that the UK’s 5m rural households are richer on average than 20m urban counterparts, with countryside average disposable household incomes of £35,500 and urban incomes of only £32,500.

If experts from the Resolution Foundation and the Institute for Fiscal Studies are correct, 2016 is set to be the last year for some time of falling income inequality, because benefits for non-pensioners are set to be frozen for four years in cash terms until 2020.

https://www.ft.com/content/394b82da-d74f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e

La izquierda siempre trata de peddle su vision apocaliptica del capitalismo asi que no es de extranar que la realidad no se corresponda con la propaganda. Tu como votante del PSOE lo deberias saber.

Por otro lado Maggie tuvo que apechugar con las consecuencias de cerrar las minas y otros sectores deficitarios para levantar al pais de la depresion en la que lo habian dejado los socialistas, por lo que el paro en un principio aumento, y con ello la desigualdad.

Pero la dama de hierro ha sido la autentica ganadora en el largo plazo. De hecho los socialistas tuvieron que inventarse lo de la tercera via de Blair para seguir enganando al pobretariado, aunque menos.
Ahora sale el semipodemita Corbyn, heredero de aquel socialismo rancio preThatcher, que dios nos pille confesaos como mande algun dia.

[Fizban·]

¡Viva la Revolución Bolivariana!

As Venezuela crumbles, the regime digs in

Nicolás Maduro draws the wrong conclusions from the economic crisis

Jan 28th 2017 | CARACAS
EVERY weekday morning, a queue of several dozen forlorn people forms outside the dingy headquarters of SAIME, Venezuela’s passport agency. As shortages and violence have made life in the country less bearable, more people are applying for passports so they can go somewhere else. Most will be turned away. The government ran out of plastic for laminating new passports in September. “I’ve just been told I might need to wait eight months!” says Martín, a frustrated applicant. A $250 bribe would shorten the wait.

As desperation rises, so does the intransigence of Venezuela’s “Bolivarian” regime, whose policies have ruined the economy and sabotaged democracy. The economy shrank by 18.6% last year, according to an estimate by the central bank, leaked this month to Reuters, a news agency (see chart). Inflation was 800%.

These are provisional figures, subject to revision. They may never be published (the central bank stopped reporting complete economic data more than a year ago). The inflation estimate is close to that of the IMF, which expects consumer prices to rise by 2,200% this year. The Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister company of The Economist, puts last year’s economic contraction at 13.7%. That is still much sharper than the decline in Greece’s output at the height of the euro crisis. In 2001 Venezuela was the richest country in South America; it is now among the poorest.

Venezuela’s salsa-loving president, Nicolás Maduro, has responded to bad news with bluster (he blames foreign and domestic “mafias”) and denial. Soon after the leak of the central bank’s estimates he fired its president, Nelson Merentes. Mr Maduro may have held him responsible for the leak. Or he may have punished him for a botched attempt by the government in December to introduce new banknotes.

A currency swap makes sense. The 100-bolívar note, long the highest denomination, is worth less than three cents on the black market. Shopkeepers sometimes weigh them instead of counting them. They are to be replaced with a new set of notes worth up to 20,000 bolívares.

The government’s stated reason for making the switch—to punish hoarders—made no sense. Who would store up the world’s fastest depreciating currency? Its execution was tragicomic. After Venezuelans had queued for days to return to banks bills about to lose their value (sometimes in exchange for notes with even smaller denominations) the replacements failed to show up. Chaos ensued as Venezuelans returned to the banks to withdraw 100-bolívar notes. Their demonetisation is now scheduled for February 20th.

The change at the top of the central bank does not portend better policies. Ricardo Sanguino, the new president, is a Marxist former university professor who has spent 15 years as a loyal parliamentarian from the ruling socialist party. He will have less influence than Ramón Lobo, the newly appointed economy tsar, an economist with little high-level experience.

They are unlikely to deal with the causes of Venezuela’s penury. These include controls on foreign exchange and prices of basic goods, which lead to shortages and corruption; unrestrained public spending; the expropriation of private industry; and the plundering of PDVSA, the state oil company, which provides nearly all of Venezuela’s export revenues.

Ordinary Venezuelans have lost faith in the regime, if not in chavismo, the pro-poor populism espoused by the late Hugo Chávez, who ruled from 1999 until 2013. Mr Maduro, his successor, has an approval rating of 24%. In December 2015 Venezuelans elected a parliament dominated by the opposition.

Mr Maduro’s response has been to cling on to power more tightly. The electoral commission, controlled by the regime, has blocked a referendum to recall him from office. The supreme court, manned by government loyalists, has blocked almost everything the national assembly has tried to do. On January 15th Mr Maduro delivered his annual state-of-the-nation address not to the legislature, as the constitution requires, but before the court.

The regime says it wants dialogue with the opposition but has done little to enable it. Talks mediated by the Vatican and by Unasur, a regional body, broke down in December after the opposition accused the government of reneging on promises, including to release political prisoners and restore powers to parliament.

Mr Maduro’s recent appointment of a new vice-president suggests that the regime is moving further away from dialogue and reform. He replaced Aristóbulo Istúriz, a moderate by chavista standards, with Tareck El Aissami, a hardliner. One of Mr El Aissami’s first acts was to announce the arrest of Gilber Caro, an opposition politician. He had an assault rifle and explosives in his car, the government claims; his party says the weapons were planted.

Mr Maduro appears to be making two bets. The first is on disarray among the opposition. Divisions within the Democratic Unity alliance, a grouping of many parties, are widening as their efforts to defeat chavismo falter. It lacks a leader who can appeal to poor Venezuelans who feel betrayed by the regime’s empty promises.

Mr Maduro’s second hope is that oil prices will bounce back. They have already recovered from $21 a barrel in 2016 to $45. But PDVSA has been so badly managed and starved of investment that it will struggle to reap the benefits. Output fell by 10% last year and no rise is likely in 2017. Venezuela’s foreign reserves have dwindled to less than $11bn; its easy-to-sell assets are about a fifth of that. Mr Maduro vows that 2017 will be the “first year of the new history of the Venezuelan economy”. That will not shorten the passport queues.

http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21715694-nicol-s-maduro-draws-wrong-conclusions-economic-crisis-venezuela-crumbles

Como predije hace mucho tiempo, sin ingresos petroleros descomunales, el milagro de Hugo Chávez (que lo hubo) en reducción de la pobreza se convierte en un espejismo.

Lo peor es que prefirieron alargar el espejismo recortando las inversiones en nuevos pozos de PDVSA, en vez de afrontar que el sistema era insostenible. La producción petrolera lleva años cayendo, y sin inversiones cuantiosas (que seguramente necesitarían capital privado extranjero, porque el país directamente no tiene dólares para llevarlas a cabo), su futuro es seguir cayendo.

Venezuela hoy un poquito más pobre que ayer, pero menos que mañana.

Un saludo.

[Fizban·]

Eso que era imposible que pasase (¿eh, Metz?):

Londres recupera los 23.800 millones del rescate de Lloyds y gana casi 1.000 millones
El banco vuelve totalmente a manos privadas tras devolver al Estado todo el dinero del contribuyente

El banco Lloyds Banking Group ha confirmado este miércoles que ha regresado totalmente a la propiedad privada, casi nueve años después de que fuera rescatado por el antiguo Gobierno laborista británico durante la crisis crediticia global. El Ejecutivo llegó a ser el dueño del 43% de la entidad. Los nuevos gestores no solo han devuelto la totalidad del dinero invertido para el rescate (23.868 millones de euros), sino que además ha hecho ganar a Reino Unido casi 1.000 millones de euros, según su presidente, Norman Blackwell.

Saludos.

[Sasa Radunovic]

¿Y en España como llevamos de momento la cuenta?

[Ainsthrilln Turion]

¿Y en España como llevamos de momento la cuenta?

Pues palmando mucha pasta, de momento 48 mil millones, menos lo que se recupere vendiendo Bankia y BMN.

Saludos.

[Van Zant]

¿Y en España como llevamos de momento la cuenta?

Pues palmando mucha pasta, de momento 48 mil millones, menos lo que se recupere vendiendo Bankia y BMN.

Saludos.

Una pregunta, por que no lo he visto contabilizados en ningún lado, ¡los dividendos del ultimo año de Bankia se han contabilizado de alguna manera?

[Ainsthrilln Turion]

¿Y en España como llevamos de momento la cuenta?

Pues palmando mucha pasta, de momento 48 mil millones, menos lo que se recupere vendiendo Bankia y BMN.

Saludos.

Una pregunta, por que no lo he visto contabilizados en ningún lado, ¡los dividendos del ultimo año de Bankia se han contabilizado de alguna manera?

Sí, dividendos e intereses van restados.

Aunque no tengo claro cómo, pues técnicamente el FROB no es accionista de Bankia sino de BFA, que a su vez es de Bankia.

No se habla nada de BFA, pero dependiendo de cómo liquide el resto de sus activosla factura también cambiará bastante.

[Hay_sinla]

[Hay_sinla]

[Hay_sinla]

[Hay_sinla]

Yo no rescataba NINGUN BANCO...creaba un banco nacional y solo rescataba el dinero de las familias en cuenta corriente. Y a correr, si parte que parta cuanto antes.

Cuando 60.000 millones no son nada

La reestructuración bancaria es una privatización como las de la sanidad o la educación. Hemos perdido unas instituciones que tenían la posibilidad de funcionar de otra manera, y encima a un coste exorbitante
ISIDRO LÓPEZ / EMMANUEL RODRÍGUEZ

La semana pasada nos atragantamos con una noticia: el Banco de España admitía que se han perdido 60.000 millones de euros en los rescates y la reestructuración de las cajas de ahorro. Nada, una ganga. Es tan poco que resulta feo mencionarlo. Quizás habría que reconocer alguna imprudencia, como la promesa de PSOE y PP –que en esto fueron de la mano– de que el rescate no costaría un euro al erario público. Pero poco más.
Y sin embargo, esta cifra ridiculiza a muchas otras partidas de gasto público para las que, según el discurso oficial, no hay dinero. Por poner ejemplos cercanos, 60.000 millones es el equivalente a tres veces el presupuesto anual de la Comunidad de Madrid, o dos veces el de Andalucía y Cataluña.
http://ctxt.es/es/20170621/Firmas/13441 ... Espana.htm

[Hay_sinla]

[Metzger1985]

Los bancos son un chollo. Cuando ganan dinero, beneficios para ellos y sus accionistas. ¿Cuando pierden? Pagas tú la factura.

[Ainsthrilln Turion]

Los bancos son un chollo. Cuando ganan dinero, beneficios para ellos y sus accionistas. ¿Cuando pierden? Pagas tú la factura.

Se lo cuentas a los accionistas del Popular.

[Ainsthrilln Turion]

Ese chiste que es Grecia:

http://www.elmundo.es/blogs/elmundo/el-mundo-de-ayer/2017/07/15/adultos-en-la-sala-la-ciega-arrogancia.html

Varufakis se ha quedado a gusto...

El mayor problema que tiene la verdadera izquierda para gobernar es que una vez en el poder está más ocupada en acuchillarse entre corrientes rivales que en gobernar.

Saludos.

[ChatoMillera]

Como va la deuda española?
Con la recuperación económica irá disminuyendo